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LAOS, FUTURE PROSPECTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
JOEL M. HALPERN 
This article is not an attempt to assess the contemporary ( 1965) 
situation in Laos or to deal in detail with the politics of the immediate 
past.* Our task is, rather, to outline briefly some of the most crucial fac- 
tors which will play an important role in shaping the country's future. 
Laos is a small, land-locked country sandwiched in between three large 
states: China, Vietnam, and Thailand. Each of these countries contain 
significant numbers of people ethnically similar to the people of Laos. 
The dominant group in the Kingdom of Laos, the valley Lao, are for all 
practical purposes very similar in both language and culture to the North- 
eastern and Northern Thai. The Mekong River, although an international 
boundary, promotes rather than impedes contacts between the Lao and 
Northeast Thai. Although in the North and East the terrain is mountain- 
ous, the same kinds of people, the tribal Tai, Meo and Yao, are found in 
both China and Vietnam. Thus, boundaries in this area are purely political; 
in no sense do they constitute ethnic or cultural frontiers. On the contrary, 
until recent times people traded and migrated freely across them. The 
significant point can be made that there is no ethnic group found in Laos 
which does not occur in larger numbers in one of the neighboring states. 
Prior to the coming of the French in the latter part of the 19th century, 
Laos had been split into the petty princedoms of Champassak, Vientiane, 
Xieng Khouang, and Luang Prabang, although a t  times they had been 
united. During the 18th and 19th centuries, frequent invasions by Annam, 
by groups such as the Hi3 from China and by the Siamese, contributed to 
many divisions. The Lao princedoms paid tribute to such foreign elements 
as  these. Indeed, a t  the time of the French expansion, the Thai had recently 
decimated Vientiane, and much of its population had crossed over into 
Siam. The only princedom surviving was that of Luang Prabang where 
the French were welcomed as protectors who would stand between the Lao 
and the Siamese, and to a lesser extent fend off menaces from the North. 
French control of Vietnam assured peace in the East. 
This attitude of regarding the colonizers as protectors is still found 
among the older generation of Lao intellectuals who continue to consider 
themselves, "children of the French peace." I t  is only now dying off. Not a 
few of the offspring of the Lao elite have intermarried with the French and 
a number of prominent Lao officials continue to look to France as a kind of 
* A  comprehensive survey of recent Laotian politics now exists: Arthur J.  Dommen, 
Conflict In Laos, The Politics of Neutralization (Praeger, 1964) .  
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second homeland. Many of the top leaders have received their university 
education there; French has been the language of instruction in the upper 
levels of the Laotian educational system, with Lao taught as a foreign 
language. 
Although no accurate population statistics exist, approximately one half 
of the population of the country are non-Lao, belonging to various tribal 
groups, both those indigenous to the country and those like the Meo, Yao, 
and some of the Tai who have migrated south from China and north Viet- 
nam over the past century. Many, if not most, of these peoples are also 
oriented primarily toward their tribal religions, a particularly significant 
fact since the official religion of the Laos is Buddhism. Further, most of 
these tribal peoples are mainly dependent on slash-and-burn agriculture 
and occupy the slopes and tops of the mountains, while the valley Lao sub- 
sist on rice grown in diked fields. 
The Kingdom of Laos has few visible sources of economic viability, al- 
though there are tin mines, and some plantations have existed in the high 
lands in the South; while in the North there are teak forests that can be 
exploited, and some of the mountain peoples, notably the Meo, produce 
opium. 
In brief, these are some of the main factors upon which the future of 
Laos will be built. Clearly, both Thailand and Vietnam will play a vital 
role in that future. The external influences of these two countries (and 
doubtless a growing role for China) will be decisive. These trends are al- 
ready evident. Although it would be an oversimplification to say that the 
Communist Pathet Lao are controlled by North Vietnam or that the Royal 
Lao government is directed from Thailand, it is a clearly established fact 
that both of these countries have played a key role in recent Lao 
affairs, including the sending of troops, although the intervention, in the 
main, has tended to take place in a covert fashion, with the sending of 
advisors rather than whole units. This situation may well be undergoing 
a change. Excluded from this discussion, in any case, is the passage of 
troops from North Vietnam into South Vietnam through those eastern areas 
of the country controlled by the Pathet Lao. Nor is an attempt made to 
pass judgment on the frequent protests of the Lao government on the incur- 
sion of North Vietnamese military units, some of which charges appear to 
be better documented than others. 
More significant for the long run development of Laos has been the re- 
establishment by the Pathet Lao of road networks linking Laos, through 
Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua, with North Vietnam and the sea. These are 
vital lines of communication which were originally built during the latter 
period of French colonization before the Second World War, and which had 
subsequently been destroyed in part or fallen into disrepair. This develop- 
ment raises the whole question of the possible extent of future reintegra- 
tion of Laos into that former entity which was French Indochina. It would 
seem that current French policy is not unaware of the significance of this 
-a n ~ n n ~ n ; * n h l n  f r r t r r r m  rlwelnnmellt 
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American policy on the other hand has directly, through its economic aid 
and training programs, fostered closer links between Laos and Thailand. 
These links include the construction of roads and the providing of ferries 
which link the political capital of Vientiane with the Thai railhead across 
the river and provide a direct route to Laos from the Bangkok wharves. 
At present, of course, Laos is deeply divided in a de facto sense, with a 
strip along the Mekong River plus a few enclaves in the interior under the 
control of the Royal Lao government and oriented toward Thailand, while 
the large interior portion is linked in the main to North Vietnam through 
the Pathet Lao. I t  should be stressed that the peoples of Laos, tribal as 
well as valley Lao, despite their ethnic ties in both directions have ambiva- 
lent feelings a t  best toward these neighboring states-when they bother to 
think about the matter a t  all. These feelings of ambivalence specifically 
extend to the leadership groups, although it is more manifest in the Royal 
Lao government attitude toward Thailand and less evident in the case of 
the Pathet Lao. I t  is abundantly clear, however, that the Pathet Lao leader- 
ship may well have serious reservations about their "elder brother," the 
Vietnamese, just as in a different perspective, relations between the Viet- 
namese and Chinese are far from untroubled. 
These competing sets of relationships comprise what might be called 
the manifest political dichotomy, but there is another set of relationships 
which must be resolved, whatever the nature of external economic and 
political orientations. Specifically involved is the way or ways in which 
the tribal people will be integrated with the valley Lao into a nation-state 
or, conceivably, into part of a nation-state. Atlhough the valley Lao never 
effectively incorporated the mountain peoples into their princedoms in a 
political sense, very important ritual and trade relationships did exist. In 
fact, with some justification the point can be made that for many items, 
the hill tribes were less self sufficient than the valley Lao. A number of 
Lao villagers living along the Mekong and its tributaries have made at 
least a part-time specialization of trade with the hill peoples, often acting 
as intermediaries with the urban-based Chinese merchants. Groups such as 
the indigenous Khmu of Northern Laos have also come in large numbers 
to work in towns like Luang Prabang as well as crossing over into Thailand 
for wage labor in the teak forests. This migratory wage labor was noted by 
Western writers as long as 80 years ago. Just as the Lao were forced on 
occasion to pay tribute to their stronger neighbors, so the Lao forced the 
weaker tribal peoples to perform corvee work for them. A part of this 
resentment has been successfully exploited by the Pathet Lao. 
There is an important point, however, at which as modern nation-states, 
the policies of Thailand, North and South Vietnam, and China all run par- 
allel, namely, in the progressive incorporation of tribal groups into the 
national state by resettlement and the extension of services. In times of 
f ~ r m e r  strife, the hill peoples and often the valley Lao as well would simply 
retire further into the jungle, reverting where necessary to swidden agricul- 
ture. Today for the hill peoples of Laos as well as for the New Yorker and 
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Muscovite, there is literally no place to hide. In fact refugees are pouring 
out of the hills in Laos, approximately 150,000 by one count (between 5 
and 10% of the total population of Laos). Many are being given emergency 
relief through the American aid program. The total of displaced persons 
may well be higher than these figures would indicate since a number of 
groups have been reestablished in new locations where they have begun to 
raise their own food. It does not seem likely that they will be willing or able 
in the future to make themselves remote from roads and modern medicine. 
The very fact that a number of messianic myths have circulated among the 
various tribal groups by which magical access to the cornucopia of goods 
available in the modern city would be assured, is in itself eloquent testi- 
mony to the strong desirability of the new way of life. 
To provide services more effectively, as well as to control both tribal 
people and Lao villagers, a process of concentrating villagers in more ac- 
cessible areas is being pursued on all sides. All governments appear to be 
discouraging the more extensive and semi-migratory slash-and-bum agri- 
culture, and encouraging reliance on flood or irrigated rice. The nature of 
the ways in which these diverse cultures will blend is not yet clear, although 
leaders of tribal origin have appeared on both sides. The Communists in 
North Vietnam and Yunnan, of course, have established quite specific 
means of dealing with minority groups through the establishment of sep- 
arate districts and regions for tribal groups where their own language is 
used in the schools (at least on the elementary level) and to a certain 
extent, in the administration. The Pathet Lao still appear to be in the stage 
of the "united front," appealing to all groups to struggle together against 
the common enemy and saying little about long term aims. 
Several assumptions about the future would seem to be logical. First 
with regard to the towns, in the pre-war period and extending into the post- 
war period of national independence as well, the peoples of Laos were in 
a distinct minority in the towns of their own country. A considerable por- 
tion of the governing was done by the French and the Vietnamese, and 
much of the commerce and crafts was in the hands of the Chinese, Viet- 
namese, and a few Indians, with the Europeans serving as technicians and 
missionaries. After independence many of the Vietnamese departed, and 
the Lao became much more active in government, education, trades and 
commerce. Increasingly they have also taken over technical functions from 
the Europeans, although it should be noted that there are now more Amer- 
icans alone than there were French before the war. This is in part because 
of the great desire for rapid modernization which Laos shares with all new 
nation states. Their presence is, of course, a?so related to the present war 
situation. Meanwhile, tribal peoples, discarding their colorful costumes, 
have become more active in town life. Many of the Lao and all of the 
tribal peoples are, of course, of rural origin, and their entry into urban 
areas has been facilitated by the two major avenues of social mobility in 
Laos, the schools, and even more importantly the army, the major source 
of trained manpower in the country. The sangha or priesthood and the 
police have been other ways in which poor country boys have discoverecl 
life in the town. No large-scale industry as yet exists in Laos so the towns 
remain religious, trade, and governmental centers, although these latter two 
functions have greatly expanded in the past decade. 
How power will be shared is as yet unclear, although the waning role of 
the hereditary elite seems evident. Though the Pathet Lao in their united 
front stance have not as yet directly attacked the monarchy, its future 
seems in doubt, particularly since the present king lacks the dynamic appeal 
of his colleague in Cambodia. 
The basic tragedy of past Americat@kkKLaas_harbeeD-thatour- 
extensive economic aid-and militaryryas~stagce~rograrngrhave~~by indirect11 
promoting drasticsocial change, undermined the basis for power of the 
-- - -  
traditional elite and thkaIlie5th- we have suvposedlv been 
relying upon to encourage stabilitv. Formerly status distinctions among the 
valley Lao had been based on birth, training and merit in both the Buddhist 
religious sense and that of individual achievement, and only to a limited 
extent on differing standards of living. Foreign aid made possible a whole 
range of status distinctions based on nothing more than what was often 
fortuitous access to the sources of external assistance. But even more im- 
portant, increased education, the enlargement of the army, police, and civil 
service brought even larger numbers of people into a situation where both 
their horizons and aspirations were broadened. These aspirations, to a great 
degree unsatisfied, remain. 
To a liberal-minded Westerner, the need for redistribution of power on 
the basis of individual ability and the allocation of resources to meet rising 
aspirations seem obvious, necessary, and desirable. But it is hard to see 
how the present leadership of the Royal Lao Government, preoccupied as 
they are with the problems of day-to-day survival, can possibly come to 
grips with these problems in a decisive way. The American aid program 
focusing on rural development and refugee aid can a t  best help sustain the 
Lao government; but they cannot by the nature of the situation be ex- 
pected to initiate policies, no matter how well intention4 they may be. 
One of the most hopeful developments in this area has been the Mekong 
River development project. Although still in its preliminary stages, it shows 
great promise, not only in its potential for fostering economic and agricul- 
tural development, but as a means of fostering regional cooperation. 
These diverse elements do not fit into any coherent scheme, but once the 
political power conflicts are resolved, or even if an enduring truce can be 
attained, the problems involved in building a viable state in Laos may begin 
to be faced in a comprehensive manner. Neither side can attempt a funda- 
mental solution in the present state of intermittent warfare. Just as World 
War I1 effectively destroyed the political structure of many states, particu- 
larly in Eastern Europe, so the Japanese conquest and subsequent achieve- 
ment of independence combined with revolutionary warfare in Indochina 
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I has effectively altered the traditional and social and political structures in 
this area and created types of aspirations which were largely non-existent 
before. The present struggle is focused on who will oversee the solution of 
the problems of nation building, problems which will remain to be faced 
after the military-political conflict has been resolved. 
The prospect that these problems will be resolved in a way favorable 
to the West is not bright in the short run, but the basic need to focus on 
the common problems involved in urbanization and modernization does not 
automatically demand a pessimistic long range view. On the contrary, as 
the situation in Eastern Europe indicates, long range trends toward diver- 
sity within a system of universal modernization present a t  least some reas- 
ons for optimism from a broad humanistic viewpoint. 
Recent Publications Dealing with Laos 
This country is one of the most poorly known in Asia from the stand- 
point of the English language public and, one might add, to a ~i~gnificant 
extent for the scholarly world as well. Several years ago France-Asie pub- 
lished a special issue on Laos. Subsequently translated into English and 
published in Saigon in 1959, this volume deals mainly with history, the 
arts, ethnography, religion, language, and literature. A year later, the 
HRAF Press in New Haven brought out a handbook on Laos containing 
brief chapters on a number of topics including political dynamics, govern- 
ment, economy, labor, the financial system, and foreign relations. Both of 
these volumes contain extensive bibliographies. The communist Pathet Lao 
point of view is represented in the writings of the Communist Australian 
journalist, Wilfred G. Bruchett (who resides in Moscow), in his book 
Mekong Upstream, originally published in Hanoi and subsequently by 
Seven Seas in East Berlin in 1959. His more recent effort pertaining in 
part to Laos is The Furtive War,  The United States in Vietnam and Laos 
(New York: International Publishers, 1963). 
Perhaps most useful to the student of political affairs is the volume, 
Conflict in Laos, The Politics of Neutralization, by Arthur J .  Dommen 1 
(Praeger: 1964), which deals in great detail with the decade 1954-1964, 
and examines the significance of the two Geneva conferences. This book 
also contains a useful bibliography. Another recent summary is the chap- 
ter on Laos by Roger M. Smith in Governments and Politics of Southeast 
Asia (edited by George M. Kahin, Cornell Univ. Press, 1965). An attempt 
to deal with recent events, especially the coup d'etat and the emergence 
of a third force in the person of Captain Kong le and his associates is the 1 
nwel The Brinkman by Desmond Meiring, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1965), in which the prominent participants are scarcely concealed. Here, 
the role of American intelligence officials and Vietnamese revolutionaries 
is particularly emphasized. 
The writings of Bernard Fall, although primarily concerned with Viet- 
nam, do provide useful information on closely related matters in Laos, 
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e.g. The Two Viet-Nams (Praeger, 1964). Information on social and eco- 
nomic aspects of Laos, aside from the purely political, is largely lacking. 
To a certain extent, this gap has been filled by the two monographs of Joel 
Halpern issued by Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph 
Series Nos. 4 and 5, 1964; Government, Politics and Social Structure in 
Laos: A Study of Tradition and Innovation, and Economy and Society of 
Laos, A Brief Survey. 
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